Winand Emons

Phone: +41 31 684 80 81
E-Mail: winand.emons@unibe.ch

Current Position

• August 2023 – present: Professor emeritus

Previous Positions

• 1984 – 1987: Assistant, University of Bonn
• 1987 – 1988: Visiting Scholar, University of California, San Diego
• 1988 – 1992: Assistant, University of Basel
• 1992 – 2023: Professor of Economic Theory, University of Bern

Education

• 1982: Diplom Volkswirt, University of Bonn
• 1983 – 1984: Research student, London School of Economics
• 1986: Dr. rer.pol., University of Bonn
• 1990: Habilitation, University of Basel

Research Interests

• Economics of uncertainty and information
• Industrial organization
• Law and economics

Selected Publications (in pdf format)

• “Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations” (with Severin Lenhard), American Law and Economics Review, 24 (2022), 589-613, Winner, 2021 Antitrust Writing Awards: Articles, Academic.

• “The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70 (2020), Article 102619.
• “Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs”, (with Claude Fluet), Theory and Decision, 87 (2019), 341-363.
• “Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence”, (with Marc Blatter and Silvio Sticher), Review of Industrial Organization, 52 (2018), 403-427.
• “Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence”, (with L. Anderson, G. DeAngelo, B. Freeborn, and H. Lang), Economic Inquiry, 55 (2017), 1833-1876.
• “Why Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts”, (with Claude Fluet), International Review of Law and Economics, 47 (2016), 16-23.
• “Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality”, (with Claude Fluet), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (2012), 352-360.
• “The Market for Used Cars: New Evidence of the Lemons Phenomenon”, (with George Sheldon), Applied Economics, 41 (2009), 2867-2885.
• “Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures”, (with Claude Fluet), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25 (2009), 134-156.
• “Conditional versus Contingent Fees”, Oxford Economic Papers, 59 (2007), 89-101.
• “Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders”, Economic Inquiry, 42 (2004), 496-502.
• “Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 49 (2001), 247-268.
• “Credence Goods Monopolists”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19 (2001), 375-389.
• “Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts”, Rand Journal of Economics 28 (1997), 107-119.
• “Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 14 (1996), 465-484.
• “Asset Prices and Public Information: An Empirical Investigation in the Market for Automobiles”, (with Jürgen von Hagen), European Economic Review 35 (1991), 1529-1542.
• “On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical”, (with Joel Sobel), Review of Economic Studies 58 (1991), 375-390.
• “Efficient Liability Rules for an Economy with Non-Identical Individuals”, Journal of Public Economics 42 (1990), 89-104.
• “On the Limitation of Warranty Duration”, Journal of Industrial Economics 37 (1989), 287-301.
• “Warranties, Moral Hazard, and the Lemons Problem”, Journal of Economic Theory 46 (1988), 16-33.

• Discussion Papers
• “The Economics of Advice” (with Severin Lenhard), Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Bern, 22-14.
• “The Economics of Litigation Financing” (with Francesco Parisi), CEPR Discussion Paper 77800 – 1729092083.