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Refereed Publications
“Warranties, Moral Hazard , and the Lemons Problem” , Journal of Economic Theory 46 (1988), 16-33.
“On the Limitation of Warranty Duration” , Journal of Industrial Economics 37 (1989), 287-301.
“The Theory of Warranty Contracts ” , Journal of Economic Surveys 3 (1989), 43-57.
“Efficient Liability Rules for an Economy with Non-Identical Individuals” , Journal of Public Economics 42 (1990), 89-104.
“Some Recent Developments in the Economic Analysis of Liability Law: An Introduction” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146 (1990), 237-248.
“More on Damage Measures, Breach of Contract, and Renegotiation” , in “Law and Economics: Some further Insights” (R. Pardolesi, R. Van den Bergh, Hrsg.), giuffrè editore (1991), 51-70.
“On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical” , (with Joel Sobel), Review of Economic Studies 58 (1991), 375-390.
“Asset Prices and Public Information: An Empirical Investigation in the Market for Automobiles” , (with Jürgen von Hagen), European Economic Review 35 (1991), 1529-1542.
“An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts” , Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 129 (1993), 625-642.
“Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade” , Open Economies Review 129 (1993), 625-642.
“The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design” , International Review of Law and Economics 14 (1994), 479-491.
“Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration” , International Journal of Industrial Organization 14 (1996), 465-484.
“Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts” , Rand Journal of Economics 28 (1997), 107-119.
“Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Insufficient Attorney Effort” , International Review of Law and Economics 20 (2000), 21-33.
“Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, , 156 (2000), 431-444.
“Credence Goods Monopolists” , International Journal of Industrial Organization 19 (2001), 375-389.
“Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies” , Journal of Industrial Economics 49 (2001), 247-268. Deutsche Version: “Unvollkommene Tests und natürliche Versicherungsmonopole”.
“Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159 (2003), 259–279 (with Robert Cooter).
“A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders” , International Review of Law and Economics 23 (2003), 253–259.
“Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders” , Economic Inquiry 42 (2004), 496-502.
“Truth-Bonding and other Truth-Revealing Mechanism for Courts” , European Journal of Law and Economics 17 (2004), 307-323 (with Robert Cooter).
“Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 161 (2005), 392-410.
“US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees: Agency Problems and the Supply of Legal Services” , Managerial and Decision Economics 27 (2006), 379-385 (with Nuno Garoupa).
“Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders when the Government Can and Cannot Commit to Sanctions” , in “Frontiers on Regulation and Liability”, (D. Martimort, Ed.), Ashgate Publishers, (2006), 155-171.
“Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees?” , American Law and Economics Review 8 (2006), 261-274.
“Conditional versus Contingent Fees” , Oxford Economic Papers 59 (2007), 89-101
“Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders” , International Review of Law and Economics 7 (2007), 170-178.
“Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures” , Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 25 (2009), 134-156 (with Claude Fluet).
“Genetic Tests and Inter-temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets” , The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy : Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 26 (2009).
“The Market for Used Cars: New Evidence of the Lemons Phenomenon” , (with George Sheldon), Applied Economics , 41 (2009), 2867-2885.
“Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality” , (with Claude Fluet), International Journal of Industrial Organization , 30 (2012), 352-360.
“Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 169 (2013), 605-620.
“Why Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts” , (with Claude Fluet), International Review of Law and Economics, 47 (2016), 16-23.
“Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence” , (with L. Anderson, G. DeAngelo, B. Freeborn, and H. Lang), Economic Inquiry, 55 (2017), 1833-1876.
“Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence” , (with Marc Blatter and Silvio Sticher), Review of Industrial Organization, 52 (2018), 403-427.
“Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs” , (with Claude Fluet), Theory and Decision, 87 (2019), 341-363.
“Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony” , (with Claude Fluet), Revue Economique, 71 (2020), 429-457.
“The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion” , International Journal of Industrial Organization , 70 (2020), Article 102619.
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations” (with Severin Lenhard), American Law and Economics Review , 24 (2022), 589-613, Winner, 2021 Antitrust Writing Awards: Articles, Academic.
Other Publications
“On the Economic Theory of Warranties”, Dissertationsschrift, Bonn 1987.
“Kreditsicherheiten aus Informationsökonomischer Sicht” , in ”Personalsicherheiten” (W. Wiegand, Hrsg), Berner Bankrechtstag, Stämpfli+Cie, 1997, 13-21.
“Competitive Experts: A Solution to the Credence Goods Problem” , in “Ökonomische Analyse von Verträgen” (W. Franz et.al., Hrsg), Mohr-Siebeck, 2000, 148-180.
“Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale” , Wirtschaftsdienst 11 (2001), 664-668.
“Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung: Eine Analyse aus der Sicht von New Institutional Economics” , Wirtschaftsdienst 7 (2003), 432-436 (with Gabrielle Wanzenried).
“Credence Goods: The Monopoly Case” , Incentives and Economic Behaviour, Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft 76 (2005),17-41.
“Conditional versus Contingent Fees” , in “New Frontiers of Law and Economics“ (P. Nobel and M. Gets Eds.) Schulthess, 2006, 159-162.
“Conditional and Contingent Fees” , in “Internationalization of the Law and its Economic Analysis“ (T. Eger, J.Bigus, C. Ott, T. v. Wangenheim Eds.) Gabler, 2008, 327-335.
“The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony when the Arbiter Can and Cannot Commit” , (with Claude Fluet), in “Research Handbook on the Economic Models of Law” (T. Miceli and M. Baker Eds.), Edward Elgar, 2013, 175-192.
“Legal Fees and Lawyers’ Compensation” , in “The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics” (F. Parisi Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2017, 247-258.
“Credence Goods: A Symposium “, (with Rudolf Kerschbamer and Gerd Mühlheusser), in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 180 (2024), 1-16.
Unpublished Monographs
“On the Economic Theory of Liability Law”, Habilitationsschrift, Basel April 1990.
Discussion Papers
Book Reviews
Stephen, F. H.: “The Economics of the Law” , Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books (1988), Kyklos 42 (1989), 299.
Cooter, R. and T. Ulen: “Law and Economics” , Scott, Foresman and Co., Glenview, Ill. (1988), Kyklos 43 (1990), 139-140.
Holler, M. und G. Illing: “Einführung in die Spieltheorie” , Heidelberg: Springer (1991), Kyklos 44 (1991), 478-479.
Ott, K. und H. B. Schäfer: “Ökonomische Analyse des Unternehmensrechts” , Heidelberg: Physika (1993), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151 (1995), 590-592.
Baird, D. G., Gertner, R. H., and Picker, R. C.: “Game Theory and the Law” , Harvard University Press (1994), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152 (1996), 436-437.
Bester, H.: “Theorie der Industrieökonomik” , Heidelberg, Springer (2000), Kyklos 53 (2000), 391-392.
Comments
Gilbert, R.: “Legal and Economic Issues in the Commercialization of New Technology”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 147 (1991), 182-184.
Schmidt-Trenz, H. J. und D. Schmidtchen: “Theorie optimaler Rechtsräume”, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 13 (1994), 30-31.
Neven D. and T. von Ungern-Sternberg: “Swiss Competition Policy in The Last Decade”, in: P. Bacchetta and W. Wasserfallen: ”Economic Policy in Switzerland”, MacMillan (1997), 58-59.
Kirstein, R. und A. Neunzig “Internationale Zuständigkeit von Gerichten und die Anerkennung ausländischer Urteile”, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, (1998) 369-371.
Bru, L. and X. Vives: “Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 158 (2002), 110-112.
Schweizer, U.: “Die schadensrechtliche Lösung von Hold-up-Problemen”, in: W. Franz et al: “Arbeitsverträge”, Mohr Siebeck (2008), 49-51.