Skip to content
Refereed Publications
“Warranties, Moral Hazard , and the Lemons Problem” , Journal of Economic Theory 46 (1988), 16-33.
“On the Limitation of Warranty Duration” , Journal of Industrial Economics 37 (1989), 287-301.
“The Theory of Warranty Contracts ” , Journal of Economic Surveys 3 (1989), 43-57.
“Efficient Liability Rules for an Economy with Non-Identical Individuals” , Journal of Public Economics 42 (1990), 89-104.
“Some Recent Developments in the Economic Analysis of Liability Law: An Introduction” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146 (1990), 237-248.
“More on Damage Measures, Breach of Contract, and Renegotiation” , in “Law and Economics: Some further Insights” (R. Pardolesi, R. Van den Bergh, Hrsg.), giuffrè editore (1991), 51-70.
“On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical” , (with Joel Sobel), Review of Economic Studies 58 (1991), 375-390.
“Asset Prices and Public Information: An Empirical Investigation in the Market for Automobiles” , (with Jürgen von Hagen), European Economic Review 35 (1991), 1529-1542.
“An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts” , Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 129 (1993), 625-642.
“Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade” , Open Economies Review 129 (1993), 625-642.
“The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design” , International Review of Law and Economics 14 (1994), 479-491.
“Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration” , International Journal of Industrial Organization 14 (1996), 465-484.
“Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts” , Rand Journal of Economics 28 (1997), 107-119.
“Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Insufficient Attorney Effort” , International Review of Law and Economics 20 (2000), 21-33.
“Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, , 156 (2000), 431-444.
“Credence Goods Monopolists” , International Journal of Industrial Organization 19 (2001), 375-389.
“Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies” , Journal of Industrial Economics 49 (2001), 247-268. Deutsche Version: “Unvollkommene Tests und natürliche Versicherungsmonopole”.
“Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159 (2003), 259–279 (with Robert Cooter).
“A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders” , International Review of Law and Economics 23 (2003), 253–259.
“Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders” , Economic Inquiry 42 (2004), 496-502.
“Truth-Bonding and other Truth-Revealing Mechanism for Courts” , European Journal of Law and Economics 17 (2004), 307-323 (with Robert Cooter).
“Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 161 (2005), 392-410.
“US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees: Agency Problems and the Supply of Legal Services” , Managerial and Decision Economics 27 (2006), 379-385 (with Nuno Garoupa).
“Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders when the Government Can and Cannot Commit to Sanctions” , in “Frontiers on Regulation and Liability”, (D. Martimort, Ed.), Ashgate Publishers, (2006), 155-171.
“Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees?” , American Law and Economics Review 8 (2006), 261-274.
“Conditional versus Contingent Fees” , Oxford Economic Papers 59 (2007), 89-101
“Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders” , International Review of Law and Economics 7 (2007), 170-178.
“Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures” , Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 25 (2009), 134-156 (with Claude Fluet).
“Genetic Tests and Inter-temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets” , The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy : Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 26 (2009).
“The Market for Used Cars: New Evidence of the Lemons Phenomenon” , (with George Sheldon), Applied Economics , 41 (2009), 2867-2885.
“Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality” , (with Claude Fluet), International Journal of Industrial Organization , 30 (2012), 352-360.
“Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians” , Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 169 (2013), 605-620.
“Why Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts” , (with Claude Fluet), International Review of Law and Economics, 47 (2016), 16-23.
“Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence” , (with L. Anderson, G. DeAngelo, B. Freeborn, and H. Lang), Economic Inquiry, 55 (2017), 1833-1876.
“Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence” , (with Marc Blatter and Silvio Sticher), Review of Industrial Organization, 52 (2018), 403-427.
“Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs” , (with Claude Fluet), Theory and Decision, 87 (2019), 341-363.
“Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony” , (with Claude Fluet), Revue Economique, 71 (2020), 429-457.
“The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion” , International Journal of Industrial Organization , 70 (2020), Article 102619.
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations” (with Severin Lenhard), American Law and Economics Review , 24 (2022), 589-613, Winner, 2021 Antitrust Writing Awards: Articles, Academic.
“The Economics of Advice” (with Severin Lenhard), Review of Industrial Organization, forthcoming.
“The Economics of Litigation Financing” (with Francesco Parisi), European Review of Private Law, forthcoming.
Other Publications
“On the Economic Theory of Warranties”, Dissertationsschrift, Bonn 1987.
“Kreditsicherheiten aus Informationsökonomischer Sicht” , in ”Personalsicherheiten” (W. Wiegand, Hrsg), Berner Bankrechtstag, Stämpfli+Cie, 1997, 13-21.
“Competitive Experts: A Solution to the Credence Goods Problem” , in “Ökonomische Analyse von Verträgen” (W. Franz et.al., Hrsg), Mohr-Siebeck, 2000, 148-180.
“Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale” , Wirtschaftsdienst 11 (2001), 664-668.
“Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung: Eine Analyse aus der Sicht von New Institutional Economics” , Wirtschaftsdienst 7 (2003), 432-436 (with Gabrielle Wanzenried).
“Credence Goods: The Monopoly Case” , Incentives and Economic Behaviour, Schriften zu Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft 76 (2005),17-41.
“Conditional versus Contingent Fees” , in “New Frontiers of Law and Economics“ (P. Nobel and M. Gets Eds.) Schulthess, 2006, 159-162.
“Conditional and Contingent Fees” , in “Internationalization of the Law and its Economic Analysis“ (T. Eger, J.Bigus, C. Ott, T. v. Wangenheim Eds.) Gabler, 2008, 327-335.
“The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony when the Arbiter Can and Cannot Commit” , (with Claude Fluet), in “Research Handbook on the Economic Models of Law” (T. Miceli and M. Baker Eds.), Edward Elgar, 2013, 175-192.
“Legal Fees and Lawyers’ Compensation” , in “The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics” (F. Parisi Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2017, 247-258.
“Credence Goods: A Symposium “, (with Rudolf Kerschbamer and Gerd Mühlheusser), in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 180 (2024), 1-16.
Unpublished Monographs
“On the Economic Theory of Liability Law”, Habilitationsschrift, Basel April 1990.
Discussion Papers
Book Reviews
Stephen, F. H.: “The Economics of the Law” , Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books (1988), Kyklos 42 (1989), 299.
Cooter, R. and T. Ulen: “Law and Economics” , Scott, Foresman and Co., Glenview, Ill. (1988), Kyklos 43 (1990), 139-140.
Holler, M. und G. Illing: “Einführung in die Spieltheorie” , Heidelberg: Springer (1991), Kyklos 44 (1991), 478-479.
Ott, K. und H. B. Schäfer: “Ökonomische Analyse des Unternehmensrechts” , Heidelberg: Physika (1993), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151 (1995), 590-592.
Baird, D. G., Gertner, R. H., and Picker, R. C.: “Game Theory and the Law” , Harvard University Press (1994), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152 (1996), 436-437.
Bester, H.: “Theorie der Industrieökonomik” , Heidelberg, Springer (2000), Kyklos 53 (2000), 391-392.
Comments
Gilbert, R.: “Legal and Economic Issues in the Commercialization of New Technology”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 147 (1991), 182-184.
Schmidt-Trenz, H. J. und D. Schmidtchen: “Theorie optimaler Rechtsräume”, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 13 (1994), 30-31.
Neven D. and T. von Ungern-Sternberg: “Swiss Competition Policy in The Last Decade”, in: P. Bacchetta and W. Wasserfallen: ”Economic Policy in Switzerland”, MacMillan (1997), 58-59.
Kirstein, R. und A. Neunzig “Internationale Zuständigkeit von Gerichten und die Anerkennung ausländischer Urteile”, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, (1998) 369-371.
Bru, L. and X. Vives: “Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 158 (2002), 110-112.
Schweizer, U.: “Die schadensrechtliche Lösung von Hold-up-Problemen”, in: W. Franz et al: “Arbeitsverträge”, Mohr Siebeck (2008), 49-51.